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Abstract: 
The writings of Nicolas Abraham (1919-75) and Maria Torok (1926-98) are presented 
as ‘renewals of psychoanalysis’ yet their treatment of dreams in revising Freud’s Wolf 
Man case history poses significant problems for one of Freud’s principal claims for the 
dream work: that it presents as the fulfilment of a wish. Reviewing the development of 
their theory of the crypt in the ego, this paper proposes ultimately that a renewal of the 
theory of the crypt can invigorate, rather than invalidate, our received picture of dream 
work. 
 
‘I Wish to Dream’ and Other Impossible Effects of the Crypt 
 
In celebration of the centenary of the publication of Sigmund Freud’s Traumdeutung, 
the Australian Society for Continental Philosophy held a special panel at their annual 
conference, at which I was invited to speak on what Nicolas Abraham and Maria Torok 
have had to say on the subject of the ‘interpretation of dreams.’ I begin now, as then, 
with an equivocation, by stating that I wish to be able to put together a few words on 
these matters. From the great dream book itself, of course, we learned that wishes never 
come true, save in dreams, the function of which is just this: wish-fulfilment. Thus, by 
stating that I wish to write about Abraham and Torok and The Interpretation of Dreams, 
I suggest at the outset that the task is an impossible one. 
 
To explain what I mean by this, I will add a few words by way of introduction for the 
benefit of those who are unfamiliar with these theorists. Of Hungarian Jewish origins, 
Abraham and Torok emigrated to France on either side of the Second World War, and 
both lost their family to the genocide. They met in Paris in 1950, gained memberships 
of the Société Psychanalytique, and began clinical practice as psychoanalysts in 1956. 
Over the next twenty years, they collaborated on a number of essays (half of which are 
contained in translation in The Shell and the Kernel, 1994) and produced a major book, 
Cryptonymie: Le Verbier de l’Homme aux Loups (1976, translated into English in 1986 
as The Wolf Man’s Magic Word: A Cryptonymy). The collaboration concluded with 
Abraham’s unexpected death in 1975, prior to the publication of their book, although 
we may now think that their collaboration has been reinvigorated on a higher level, as 
Torok herself passed away in 1998. 
 
The pair did not easily fit into the puzzle of psychoanalytical schools of thought in the 
1950s, based in part on apprehensions about the clinical value of organised structuralist 
activity. They cultivated an ignorance of Lacan’s teachings and included commentaries 
against the systematic character of Kleinian investigation in some essays. Accordingly, 
therefore, they never pieced together a coherent body of theories that we might call an 
‘approach,’ or which could be mobilised against dominant schools of psychoanalytical 
thought. Instead, they committed themselves to interrogating the approaches that had 
been handed down to them in the light of evidence gained in their immediate analytical 
situations and critical practices. As Nicholas Rand observes in his introduction to The 
Shell and the Kernel (1994), their writings were guided by a belief that received theories 
can be ‘abandoned or revamped if inconsistent with the actual life experience of patients 
or the facts of a text’ (1). 
 
There is a sense in Abraham and Torok’s writings that no singular program is at work 
behind their words, and Rand himself admits that the essays collected within The Shell 
and the Kernel ‘expend little rhetorical energy in promoting the novelty of an idea or 
explaining how an approach departs from standard modes of thinking’ (1994, 7). Yet if 
there is a thread holding their work together, it is what Elisabeth Roudinesco (1990) has 
called their ‘idiosyncratic reading of Freud’s discovery’ (599). As practicing analysts 
themselves, there is no doubt that Abraham and Torok had no desire to undermine the 
ideas and methods developed by Freud. What is idiosyncratic about their reading of 
Freud is their willingness to re-invent a vocabulary of psychoanalytical concepts for 
each instance in which the explanatory function of these concepts must be mobilised in 
discourse. This is to say that they develop new words (or, to be precise, new meanings 
for existing words) or revisions of old concepts in response to each case (patient or text) 
for which a psychoanalytical explanation or treatment is sought. Thus, in a phrase which 
resonates in contrast with Lacan’s famous ‘return to Freud,’ Rand confidently subtitled 
the collection of essays by Abraham and Torok as ‘Renewals of Psychoanalysis.’  
 
If continual renewal of psychoanalysis is the modus operandi espoused by Abraham and 
Torok, we may wonder what value there is to be had from a reading of their works, least 
of all from the perspective of the institution of psychoanalysis. The training of analysts, 
the transmission of methods, models and concepts from one generation to the next, and, 
perhaps most importantly, the sense of the reliability of the method from one analysis to 
the next – all rely on a kind of repetition, rather than on a making anew in each instance. 
For my own part, as a non-practitioner, the more general philosophical value of their 
work is at issue here as well. If I can only wish to cover their work in the context of its 
relation to The Interpretation of Dreams, I do so in order to extrapolate from their self-
imposed limitations a sense of the boundaries of our knowledge of that which stands in 
opposition to knowledge: the unconscious. 
 
Jacques Derrida – himself having recently renewed his conversations with Abraham and 
Torok, so may he rest in peace – made some initial steps in this direction in ‘Fors,’ his 
foreword to Cryptonymie: Le Verbier de l’Homme aux Loups. Derrida’s description of 
Abraham and Torok’s achievement in this book includes recognition that the very act of 
theorising the crypt involves a rupture at the heart of the Freudian topography, based on 
confounding any distinction between interior and exterior, and calls into question the 
status of the word as it passes before the analytical ear. Elsewhere (see Johnson 2000), I 
have discussed Derrida’s role in filtering the work of Abraham and Torok to scholars in 
English and, in particular, to non-practising theorists, by foregrounding the ‘secret’ – 
the key to the crypt – as a topic for discussion, but also by calculating secrets of his own 
in relation to the authors of the ‘Verbier.’ Here it is sufficient to note that what Derrida 
says on the subject of Abraham and Torok’s achievement is extrapolated, as the authors 
themselves make no such claims for Cryptonymie in their own writing.  
 
My task here is similar, or at least follows the same contours as Derrida’s, in its relation 
to the work of Abraham and Torok. In order to explain what I mean about only being 
able to wish to speak about the relation between this work and The Interpretation of 
Dreams, this process of extrapolation must extend to their collection of essays. The title 
Rand chose for this collection is taken from an essay written by Abraham in 1968. It is 
in ‘The Shell and the Kernel’ that Abraham comes closest to spelling out a single and 
coherent programmatic statement, and the ideas developed in this essay can be read as a 
justification for the ongoing renewal undertaken in their other writings. In what is 
ostensibly a review of Jean Laplanche and Jean-Bertrand Pontalis’s Language of 
Psychoanalysis – still regarded by many as the standard dictionary of Freudian terms 
and concepts – Abraham situates the scope and originality of Freud’s discovery in what 
he calls the anasemic character of psychoanalytical language.  
 
Citing Daniel Lagache’s preface to The Language of Psychoanalysis, Abraham (1994) 
agrees that ‘ordinary language has no words for the structures and psychic movements 
which, in the eyes of common sense, do not exist’ (qtd. 85). Anasemia is that structure, 
proper to psychoanalytical speculation, which proceeds entirely from the discovery of 
the Unconscious. It is what enables any word mobilised as a psychoanalytical concept 
to be designified; that is, to be stripped of its normal capacity for meaning and to allow 
it to point instead to that which escapes or lies outside conscious expression, as its very 
source, in the Unconscious. 
 
Thus, the originality of Freud’s discovery resides in part on its capacity to be original, 
time after time, with respect to each new moment of engagement with the Unconscious 
that it plays out. The scope of psychoanalysis is not to be constrained by a single set of 
concepts and methods. Instead, it is renewable from one case to another. In order for a 
vocabulary to maintain an index of the Unconscious it must, like the Unconscious itself, 
be untimely, in the sense of being unbound by time. Renewal of this order means that 
there will be little if any sustained engagement with the old, and certainly there are few 
instances in their writings when either Abraham or Torok revisit Freud’s own cases or 
examples directly. 
 
We therefore arrive at the reason why I might only wish to write about what Abraham 
and Torok have to tell us about The Interpretation of Dreams. Throughout the essays 
Rand collected together in The Shell and the Kernel, there are only three references to 
The Interpretation of Dreams, a work thick with examples and specimen analyses. Two 
of these references are in an essay – ‘Theoretra: An Alternative to Theory’ (253-56) – 
written by Torok some seven years after their collaboration had been concluded in such 
untimely fashion. Furthermore, in The Wolf Man’s Magic Word, there are no direct 
references to Freud’s dream book at all, this despite the fact that the vast majority of 
their interest in this book is in dream analyses. 
 
Although Abraham and Torok do not refer to The Interpretation of Dreams in The Wolf 
Man’s Magic Word, it is to this work that I want to turn my attention in the remainder of 
this paper, since it is in the ‘Verbier,’ more than in any other work, that the idiosyncratic 
character of their reading of Freud hinges on dreams and dream interpretation as a mode 
of analysis. Although they do not refer to Freud’s dream book,  I intend to bring us back 
once more to The Interpretation of Dreams if only at least through the filter of one of its 
central tenets: ‘When the work of interpretation is completed, we perceive that a dream 
is the fulfilment of a wish’ (1900, 121). 
 
The Wolf Man’s Magic Word is, as the title suggests, clearly concerned with the famous 
‘Wolf Man’ who is the subject of Freud’s most detailed case history, ‘From the History 
of an Infantile Neurosis’ (1918). Yet this book does not necessarily reverse the pattern 
of earlier essays. Rather than seeking to re-analyse the Wolf Man himself, Abraham and 
Torok seek to renew psychoanalysis through the figure of the Wolf Man. The basis for 
this renewal is the claim that the case history represented a momentous ‘break’ between 
the ‘first or second topography—the early or later Freud’ (1986, 2). It was the analysis 
of the Wolf Man which sowed the ‘seeds of doubt in Freud’s first views’ (2). 
 
Their stated aim is therefore to ‘link the theories, the two eras’ and to produce a ‘more 
unified view of psychoanalysis’ (2). With this in mind, we might argue that the subject 
of their investigation was not the subject of the case history; rather their ‘subject’ is the 
case history itself, as the representative of a pivotal moment in the whole development 
of psychoanalysis. Yet this claim ignores the fact that Abraham and Torok themselves 
were, first and foremost, analysts. To their analytical sensibilities, a case history matters 
not one iota if it fails to point to the clinical reality of an analysis. Thus, in reading the 
case history anew, they are concerned not only with the hand of Freud at work in the 
polemical writing, but also with the voice of the patient with whose words the analyst’s 
pen resonates.  
 
To understand the role played by the Wolf Man in the ‘break’ between the earlier and 
later Freud, at least as Abraham and Torok picture it, we shall renew our acquaintance 
with one of the most significant dream analyses published by Freud, second perhaps in 
importance only to the dream of Irma’s injection. We may recall that it was through his 
interpretation of the dream of the wolves that Freud purported to finally have put to rest 
the dissensions of Carl Gustav Jung and Alfred Adler. Moreover, his interpretation of 
this dream provided support for the theory of deferred effect, which served as a corner-
stone for the hypothesis of infantile sexuality at the core of the aetiology of neuroses. 
 
According to Freud, the wolf dream as it was recounted in analysis manifested anew a 
primal scene in which the patient as an infant had witnessed his parents engaging in the 
sexual act a tergo. While Freud’s polemical tone in ‘From the History of an Infantile 
Neurosis’ suggests a firm conviction of the validity of his interpretation, Abraham and 
Torok read beyond the polemic to locate signs of contradiction and doubt, suggesting 
instead that this case history marks a shift in psychoanalytical thought. They had been 
aided in this exercise by the release of the Wolf Man’s memoirs by Muriel Gardiner in 
1971, which revealed aspects of Pankeiev’s childhood that Freud had not discussed in 
the case history.  
 
In particular, they revealed that in addition to the Russian that Pankeiev had spoken as a 
first language and the German he used in therapy, a third language, English, had been at 
work in a rudimentary form in the child’s earliest linguistic experiences, on the basis 
that the child’s governess had been bilingual, with English as a first language. Taking 
this polyglottism into account, Abraham and Torok contend the concealment that may 
be attributed to the dream work was then also evident in the speech act of recollecting 
material in analysis. When the patient spoke in German, he was already also speaking 
English or Russian, or, more precisely, words compiled from his secret ‘Verbier,’ the 
lexicon consisting of words from all three languages and behind which was concealed 
(by any number of possible modes of encryption) the unspeakable phrase referring to an 
altogether different primal scene. 
 
The ‘talking cure’ was thus stymied by the capacity of the patient to find ways to say 
nothing. In the five years that Abraham and Torok spent studying this Verbier, true to 
their desire to ground theory in individual contexts, they developed an explanation of 
the mechanism which produced the Wolf Man’s secret world: they called it the crypt. 
They explain that the splitting of the ego, a process normally associated with libidinal 
development in the Freudian model, may be undermined by a defence mechanism not 
recognised by Freud. If the subject loses an object which is indispensable in the early 
organisation of the psyche, or if the idealised relationship with this object is threatened, 
the object may be incorporated into the ego, meaning the subject presumes the object 
itself, rather than the words representing it, to have been completely internalised. 
 
A crypt is this monument of a lost object preserved intact within the split ego, although 
the ego continues to function as though it were intact. The subject cannot be allowed to 
expose to his or her self that the reality of the object is in fact a fantasy so representation 
of the object is censored. The crypt is not unconscious although it functions as though it 
were, filtering all material bubbling up from this nether realm before any may submit to 
the secondary processes. When a cryptophoric subject speaks, then, it is only on behalf 
of the incorporated object. In place of words, a cryptophoric subject speaks cryptonyms 
or word-things whose relation to each other is determined less by laws of syntax or lexis 
than by their relation to the object itself. 
 
Thus, Freud’s interpretation of the dream, as it was recounted in analysis, may be valid 
enough to support his conviction and yet, at the same time, he could legitimately doubt 
that what he was actually dealing with was dream work as he had understood it at the 
time he published his great dream book, almost two decades earlier. What Abraham and 
Torok describe, in other words, is a blueprint for a revised topography of the mind, 
according to which it may be possible to understand in psychoanalytical terms, how the 
psychoanalytical ear may be deceived by an intermediary between the primary and the 
secondary processes. Yet we have already noted that this blueprint is never spelled out 
so explicitly in so many words. It is in Derrida’s foreword that our attention is drawn to 
this broader implication of the theory of the crypt.  
 
Now, such extrapolation brings me to the question of another more general implication 
of the ‘Verbier’, which frames this paper: does explanation of how the psychoanalytical 
ear may be deceived by the cryptophoric patient on the couch add anything to received 
knowledge about dreams? I will argue in closing here that it does, precisely because it 
radically alters the status of the dream work from the perspective of analysis, and, by 
extension, in our broader conception of dreams. For the cryptophoric subject, according 
to Abraham and Torok, the dream work is identical to the development of symptoms, in 
so far as both ‘form one and the same double fantasy life, a double fantasy life that 
cannot coalesce into a unity unless it is transformed into an absurd thought and, thereby, 
turned into something acceptable to both halves of the Ego’ (1986, 82). 
 
Both halves of the split ego produce fantasies, the function of which is ‘to maintain the 
topographical status quo,’ yet this produces continual conflict in the degree to which all 
fantasies preserve the split within the ego by opposing themselves to fantasies produced 
by the other half of the ego. Of course, an index of internal division is a dead giveaway 
for the crypt, so there must be fantasies which maintain this division (the topographical 
status quo) while suggesting at the same time an altogether different status quo: the ego 
intact. 
 
Dreams which have their origin in fantasies of this kind have a somewhat altered status 
vis-a-vis the psychoanalytical ear. We see that these dreams are symptomatic in so far 
as they are an effect of the need to preserve the very topography of the crypt by denying 
its presence within the ego. For the cryptophoric subject, dreams do not simply screen 
repressed materials (memories or traces of past scenes and their deferred effects). They 
screen from conscious detection the topographical reality of the crypt and the split ego.  
 
In the Freudian model, dreams represent one of the ways in which the ego and superego 
maintain the status quo during sleep by enabling the fulfilment of wishes in such a way 
that they prevent us from waking and acting upon them directly. Thus, dreams are an 
effect of one of the components of the psyche. According to the logic of a cryptonymy, 
dreams can be located topographically on this side of the crypt, as the screen which the 
crypt presents to consciousness. Indeed, everything of which the cryptophoric subject is 
conscious must, by definition, be situated on this side of the crypt, therefore, outside the 
ego. Thus, the status attributed to dreams themselves need really be no different to that 
attributed to the manifest content that is recounted upon waking. Both are merely layers 
stacked upon the exterior of the crypt, the one more ‘exterior’ than the other. 
 
This observation does lead us to reconsider the implications of one of the central tenets 
of The Interpretation of Dreams, which I shall reiterate once more: ‘When the work of 
interpretation is completed, we perceive that a dream is the fulfilment of a wish’ (1900, 
121). James Hopkins (1991) links both of the components of this formula, ‘the work of 
interpretation’ and wish-fulfilment, through a logic of intentionality. Wishes can be 
expressed in the form of an articulation of motive which must contain a content – as in 
the statement, ‘I wish for A’ – thereby satisfying both a hermeneutic compulsion in the 
work of interpretation and the causal aspects directing our inner motivations towards 
objects in the world around us. 
 
Might this logic lead us to ask whether the statement ‘I wish to dream’ is an altogether 
impossible one? If a dream is the fulfilment of a wish that is directed toward a content, 
expressed in the form of the statement ‘I wish for A,’ then this content can not be the 
dream itself. In order to arrive at this conclusion, we utilise what Hopkins (1991) calls 
‘our commonsense psychological explanation,’ according to which ‘our understanding 
of linguistic meaning and motivational cause work in natural harmony’ (91-92). ‘I wish 
to dream’ is thus an impossible statement where we employ a ‘commonsense’ mode of 
explanation delimited according to linguistic meaning and intentionality as expressed 
normally in the content of statements. 
 
We might recall here that the anasemic structure of psychoanalytical language, as it is 
described by Abraham in ‘The Shell and the Kernel’ (1994), provides for understanding 
of aspects of the psyche which, in the eyes of common sense, do not exist. Certainly, it 
is fair to say that the Wolf Man’s crypt would have been inaccessible to the common 
sense mode of psychological explanation attributed to Freud by Hopkins. Yet it also 
stands to reason that for Abraham and Torok to have identified the crypt on the other 
side of the master’s own writing, the psychoanalytical language employed by Freud 
must have had sufficiently ‘uncommon’ sense (that is, anasemia) to retain a trace of the 
crypt in the first instance. Analysis itself, in this respect, then, can be seen to be a layer 
posited by the Wolf Man’s crypt as its own exterior surface, on the other side of the 
dream. 
  
According to the anasemic discourse which gives rise to the theory of the crypt, then, an 
expression of motive and content in the form of a statement such as ‘I wish for A’ is as 
likely to be the product of secondary process as any other form of conscious expression. 
The dreams of the cryptophoric subject, in particular, simply reiterate time and again, in 
a myriad of guises, the statement concealed within the crypt. As such, they are unable to 
be expressed as a wish at all – that is, perhaps, except for the possibility of a wish to be 
able to function on the basis of an intact ego which can be turned toward the outside 
world. This is to say in closing that the dreams of the cryptophoric subject may well be 
expressive of a wish to be allowed to wish, to have at least one wish, an object toward 
which the dream work might be oriented. 
 
In their renewal of the Freudian picture of dream work, is it possible then that Abraham 
and Torok might have foreclosed on the possibility of wish fulfilment, rendering invalid 
the principal contention underlining The Interpretation of Dreams? In another renewal – 
a strategic revision of Freud’s incomplete picture of the splitting of the ego in primary 
defence mechanisms – Melanie Klein (1975) suggested that the splitting of the ego is 
necessary in the formation of our earliest libidinal attachments (70). Should we consider 
the two renewals together, and conclude, therefore, that we are all, if healthy, also in 
some degree cryptophoric? Instead, we might not wish to deny Abraham and Torok of 
their insistently isolationist approach: always orient thought away from programmatic 
statements. Yet I would caution against allowing their renewals of psychoanalysis to be 
left in the moment of renewal, as a thing of the past, irrelevant. In uttering at the death 
the utterly impossible, I hope once more to make new anew: ‘I wish to dream.’ 
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